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Synopsis
Teachers and students of mathematics often view history of mathematics as just
mathematics as they know it, but in another form. This view is based on a misun-
derstanding of the nature of history of mathematics and the kind of knowledge it
attempts to acquire. Unfortunately, it can also lead to a deep sense of disappoint-
ment with the history of mathematics itself, and, ultimately, a misunderstanding
of the historical nature of mathematics. This kind of misunderstanding and the
disappointment following from it—both raised to the level of resentment—run
through the paper “A Critique of the Modern Consensus in the Historiography
of Mathematics.” My review of that paper, sent to me blind, became a response
to it. In particular, this essay attempts to clarify the nature of the historical dis-
cipline and to show that author of the Critique ends up, in effect, wanting and
not wanting history at the same time.
Viktor Bl˚asjo¨, the author of “A Critique of the Modern Consensus in the
Historiography of Mathematics,”1 says much that I accept wholeheartedly.
For example, he says:
. . . the historian wants to understand why things happened the
way they did. . . (VB, page 114).
We all agree that as historians we strive to understand past math-
ematics in its own right, not to reinterpret it by modern standards
(VB, page 118).
1Editor’s note: Bl˚asjo¨’s essay is included in this issue of the Journal of Humanistic
Mathematics. The page numbers denoted by VB refer to the pagination in [2].
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How can I disagree? This is my own historian’s credo. As for his “rational
history,” I cannot object to it insofar as it is true that:
. . . rational history is independent of the modern state of mathe-
matical knowledge. There is nothing in the definition of rational
history that restricts it to only those ideas that are precursors of
modern ones, and nothing that compels it to see only progress
and ignore “false starts” (VB, page 115).
And, again, that:
Narrow minded internalism is another trait associated with tra-
ditional scholarship, but again it is obvious that rational history
as defined above does not ignore social context insofar as it is rel-
evant to the development of mathematical ideas (VB, page 115).
Nor can I dismiss out of hand his criticism of The Oxford Handbook of
the History of Mathematics [16] that its index contains “. . . over 40 entries
for ‘weaving and mathematics’,” and not one for “calculus.” Though I must
express some reservations here, for judging a book by its index can be mis-
leading: if I were to judge from the index of The Princeton Companion to
Mathematics [10], edited by Field Medalist Timothy Gowers, for example, I
would have to conclude that only 12 pages of 1034 are dedicated to calculus!
Still, it may well be that by including the chapter “Algorithms and Automa-
tion: Mathematics and Textiles” (accounting for all 40 index entries on the
subject, by the way), Robson and Stedall gave far more emphasis than I or
Bl˚asjo¨ would give to weaving and mathematics.
I will leave it to readers of The Oxford Handbook to decide whether or
not the presence of 40 entries for weaving and mathematics is symptomatic
of the entire book and to judge it accordingly. But Bl˚asjo¨ goes beyond
the simple complaint that The Oxford Handbook lacks balance; his claim is
that the entire field of the history of mathematics has gone astray. And,
by his own statements of what “we all agree about as historians,” this can
only mean that scholars such as Eleanor Robson, Jacqueline Stedall, Nathan
Sidoli, and, above all, Sabetai Unguru are no longer “striving to understand
past mathematics in its own right” or “to understand why things happened
the way they did.” Rather, in his view, they are only protecting their own
peculiar predilections and, worse yet, they have turned their misguided tastes
into the very standards of the field so that “sycophancy becomes an entrance
requirement for any aspiring apprentice: if he does not accept the framework
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of ‘standards’ sanctioned by the self-appointed priesthood in control of the
field, then he is by definition not doing history of mathematics” (VB, page
122).
But despite the plight of the poor apprentice I am afraid it is true that
“historians are [my emphasis] free to define their own excellence” (cf. VB,
page 122), as Bl˚asjo¨ says, though this is not because, as Bl˚asjo¨ implies, they
have usurped the command of the field and have set themselves up as a
“self-appointed priesthood.” Historians do not define their own excellence
by bypassing some other objective tribunal of rational non-historians. Does
Bl˚asjo¨ believe that, say, the excellence of mathematicians could be deter-
mined by well-intentioned chemists or perhaps a congressional panel (un-
biased, naturally, by the advice of mathematicians!)? Who else besides a
number theorist could determine the excellence of work in number theory,
who else besides a topologist in topology, or a historian in history? I grant
that decision makers in government, representatives of industry, and funding
organizations may influence the direction of academic fields; yet, ultimately,
how a discipline like history defines itself rests with its practitioners. And
the process of definition is not one of decree or consensus, as if a poll were
taken, but of continual reflection. So when Bl˚asjo¨ says that “[t]he definition
of history . . . is the real crux of the matter” (VB, page 120), once again, I
tend to agree.
I would go further and say that it is part and parcel of any intellectual
discipline to think about the nature of the discipline almost as much and
as seriously as pursuing the actual business of it. Thus besides his purely
historical investigations, an historian such as G. R. Elton found time to write
a book called The Practice of History [8]; E. H. Carr wrote What is History?
[6]; R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History [7]; Marc Bloch, The Historian’s
Craft [3]. And if there is any doubt as to the importance of such works to the
historians who write them, remember Bloch worked on the Historian’s Craft
as he awaited execution by the Gestapo. That there are so many accounts
of what history is and what is at the heart of the historian’s craft underlines
of course the lack of complete agreement about the question. Still, there are
some commonalities.
One of these commonalities—really a sine qua non of history—is an acute
awareness of the tension between past and present. History wants to under-
stand the past but the historians’ materials, the objects of their study, are
things that have made their way into the present. For this reason Elton [8]
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defines history as being “concerned with all those human sayings, thoughts,
deeds and sufferings which occurred in the past and have left present deposit;”
and, Elton continues, “it deals with them from the point of view of happen-
ing, change, and the particular” (page 23). It is accordingly not just past
or present that is essential, according to Elton, but how these are treated,
namely, “from the point of view of happening, change, and the particular.”
The historical mode of thinking demands treating these “survivals” from the
past, as Michael Oakeshott calls them (see [14]), precisely as survivals. A
survival is a survival from another world. One interrogates survivors to un-
derstand where they came from—a world not conditioned by the existence
of ours, yet one out of which ours grew. In this spirit, Oakeshott [15] sets
out the historian’s task as follows:
What the historian is interested in is a dead past; a past unlike the
present. The differentia [emphasis in the original] of the histori-
cal past lies in its very disparity from what is contemporary. The
historian does not set out to discover a past where the same be-
liefs, the same actions, the same intentions obtain as those which
occupy his own world. His business is to elucidate a past indepen-
dent of the present, and he is never (as an historian) tempted to
subsume past events under general rules. He is concerned with a
particular past. It is true, of course, that the historian postulates
a general similarity between the historical past and the present,
because he assumes the possibility of understanding what belongs
to the historical past. But his particular business lies, not with
this bare and general similarity, but with the detailed dissimilar-
ity of past and present. He is concerned with the past as past,
and with each moment of the past in so far as it is unlike any
other moment” (page 106).
For historians, then, understanding the past means engaging with thoughts
and actions from a different time and, therefore, from a different world. This
is the task of history—all history, though particularly intellectual history,
which includes the history of mathematics. History is not mere chronology.
Even “old-fashioned” history was never, as Bl˚asjo¨ says, taking a sequence of
events ABCDEFGH. . . and then understanding the “sequence qua sequence”
(VB, page 114). Collingwood, whom we can take as a representative of “old-
fashioned” history or at least one who is not a representative of “fashionable
modern history,” said all of this much better than I can:
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History, then, is not, as it has so often been mis-described, a
story of successive events or an account of change. Unlike the
natural scientist, the historian is not concerned with events as
such at all. He is only concerned with those events which are the
outward expression of thoughts, and is only concerned with these
in so far as they express thoughts [7, page 217].
The point is that the “modern consensus in the historiography of math-
ematics,” if there is consensus as clear and peremptory as Bl˚asjo¨ claims, is
little more than a consensus to take seriously history as historians, old and
new, have thought about it. Unguru and the others did not invent a new
historiography. All Unguru did in his “locus classicus of modern historiogra-
phy” [18] was to point out—polemically I admit—that history of mathematics
was being pursued as if it did not need to take into account what historians
thought about history. And he was not claiming that history of mathemat-
ics had to proceed according to a specific historiography—for there is more
than one (some, in fact, which would give weaving and mathematics greater
weight and some which would give it less)—only that it begin with those
broad commonalities without which history would not be history. His mes-
sage in a nutshell was, as he put it, “[t]he history of mathematics is history
not mathematics” [19, page 563].
Bl˚asjo¨’s statement that “as historians we strive to understand past math-
ematics in its own right, not to reinterpret it by modern standards” (VB,
page 118) is in fact perfectly in line with Unguru’s position. This is why, as
a historian, I said above that I agree with it. Unfortunately, Bl˚asjo¨ seems to
miss the meaning of what he wrote, and he seems to forget that history of
mathematics is not mathematics, or, in his case, physics. Thus in clarifying
his own view of history he writes, by way of analogy:
When Newton brought out the underlying laws of mechanical
phenomena, he certainly did not do so by studying “the event
qua particular event” [he is quoting Unguru]. On the contrary,
falling apples must be “drained them of their individualities” and
seen as abstract point masses before any meaningful scientific in-
vestigation can begin. Similarly, in rational history one must ab-
stract away from idiosyncratic details, such as incidental matters
of notation, before one gets to the real subject matter of history
(VB, page 119).
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Then a few lines later he goes on more emphatically:
Doing good history, it is assumed [by his antagonists, Eleanor
Robson and Jacqueline Stedall], is to “paint a complex and rich
picture” “sensitive to its cultural context” [forgetting that only a
few pages earlier on page 115 he had said that his own rational
history “does not ignore social context”!]. Had humanity taken
the same approach to the study of nature we would still be in the
middle ages today (VB, page 119).
We could perhaps say that Bl˚asjo¨ is simply pressing for a more rigorous
methodology in historical research, sharing the dream of old 19th century
positivist historians like Henry Thomas Buckle (1821-1862). The passages
above do have something in common with Buckle’s ambition to place history
on a par with the natural sciences:
I hope to accomplish for the history of man something equivalent,
or at all events analogous, to what has been effected by other in-
quirers for the different branches of natural science. In regard to
nature, events apparently the most irregular and capricious have
been explained, and have been shown to be in accordance with
certain fixed and universal laws. This has been done because men
of ability, and, above all, men of patient, untiring thought, have
studied natural events with the view of discovering their regular-
ity: and if human events were subjected to a similar treatment,
we have every right to expect similar results [5, page 6].
Needless to say, historians since the 19th century, while still deeply concerned
with the problem of rigor, have come to see the naivete´ in the hope for a
scientific history as Buckle and others described it.2 Be that as it may, I
do not think that this is what Bl˚asjo¨ had in mind. For his remarks about
Newton’s apples follow on the heels of his discussion of symbolic notation in
analyzing historical mathematical texts. His point is not that we should be
rigorous in trying to grasp Newton’s idiosyncratic thought—he deems that
uninteresting and unimportant from the start—rather, we should abstract
Newton’s mathematics from any idiosyncratic tendencies of Newton and his
2Berlin’s “History and Theory: The Concept of Scientific History” [1] is a very engaging
discussion of the subject.
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time and treat it just as we would any other mathematics today, using any
tools modern or otherwise at our disposal. What would remain of history
in the “history of mathematics” is not clear; however, mathematics it would
be.
It is no wonder, then, that Bl˚asjo¨ fails to grasp why modern historians
of mathematics like Unguru studiously avoid modern mathematical symbol-
ism in their accounts of historical mathematical texts. He thinks that such
symbolism can “remove needless obstacles [emphasis added] to clarity and
understanding” (VB, page 116). But clarity and understanding of what?
Of the pure abstracted unhistorical (i.e. time-independent) mathematics as
Bl˚asjo¨ understands it? If so (as I think that it is so), then naturally the
older mathematicians’ formulations will get in the way. However, if one is
interested in clarity and understanding of “the past mathematics in its own
right [emphasis added],” can one really say that such older formulations are
needless obstacles? Are they not at the very core of the historical challenge?
Is not their own difficulty the precise difficulty of imagining how past mathe-
maticians actually conceived their subject? Using modern symbolic notation
sweeps away this essential historical difficulty: it allows us only to say, “in
terms of our own conceptualization what so-and-so was doing comes down
to this . . . ” It clarifies only our own mathematical mode of thought while
hopelessly obscuring that of the older mathematicians.3
It is this, I think, that Bl˚asjo¨ misses in Unguru’s arguments. He claims
that, by rejecting modern symbolic notation categorically, Unguru’s argu-
ments lead to “absurd consequences.” Bl˚asjo¨ quotes [18]: “As a matter of
fact, if we use modern algebraic symbolism, this ceases altogether to be a
proposition.” It is worth looking at the example Unguru is referring to here.
It is Euclid’s Elements, IX.8, which states:
If as many numbers as we please beginning from a unit be in
continued proportion, the third from the unit will be square, as
will also those which successively leave out one; the fourth will be
cube, as will also all those which leave out two; and the seventh
will be at once cube and square, as will also those which leave
out five. (Translation from [12, page 390 of volume II]).
3Klein’s famous book Greek Mathematical Thought and Origin of Algebra [13] gives a
deep account of the rift between the non-symbolic mathematical thought of the Greeks and
the symbolic mode of thought that has characterized mathematics since the 17th century.
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The proof is not terribly long, but it relies crucially on Euclid’s definition of
a part which in turn relies on the fundamental idea of “measuring” (katame-
trein). As Unguru points out (as does Heath in his commentary [12, page 292
of volume II]), if we express Euclid’s proposition symbolically, what there is
to prove is hard to see—the proposition becomes a mere observation. For,
when one makes the transition to a modern algebraic framework, “numbers
in continued proportion from a unit” is just this:
1, a, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, . . .
So,
1, a2, a4, a6, . . .
are squares,
1, a3, a6, a9, . . .
are cubes, and a6 is both a square and a cube, and so on.
Bl˚asjo¨ argues that if this proves that Euclid had no algebra then we might
as well assume—and this is the absurd consequence—that Vie`te had no alge-
bra since Vie`te also makes statements that we take to be obvious in algebra,
such as: “The sum of two magnitudes added to difference of the same is equal
to twice the greater magnitude.” But in a way, this example only strengthens
Unguru’s argument. For one, Vie`te makes it clear that these results are basic
or at least preliminary. That’s why he places them in a chapter entitled “Pre-
liminary matters for calculating with species” (Ad logisticen speciosam notae
priores). What was not basic was the idea of “calculating with species.” He
meant by that the revolutionary idea of calculating with symbolic entities as
opposed to “calculating with numbers” (logistice numerosa) (see [13, pages
163ff]). As Bos rightly points out, “[using letter equivalents for general in-
determinates] was not a self-evident step because it raised the question of
the status and nature of these general indeterminate magnitudes and of the
operations performed on them” [4, page 147]. Accordingly, what precedes
the “theorem” cited above is a “proposition” which lays out the procedure,
“To add the difference of two magnitudes to their sum”—and it is here that
Vie`te gives us the symbolic statement explicitly: “sit A+B addenda A-B:
summa fit A bis’’—“Let A+B be added to A-B: the sum will be twice A”.
That Vie`te only then pronounces the theorem shows, I think, that he in-
tended the reader to see how the new calculation of species makes this sort
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of relation immediate—this is exactly what algebra does best and what it
was advertised to do by its early modern proponents. The use of symbolic
notation for Euclid, then, not only conceals Euclid’s procedures but also at
the same time the revolutionary character of Vie`te’s procedures: it does as
much injustice to the early modern world as it does to the ancient world.
I hope this makes it clear that the “blanket rejection” of anachronism, as
Bl˚asjo¨ puts it, is not a matter of dogmatism or, worse, a kind of obscuran-
tism; it is, rather, an uncompromising openness to what historical thinkers
really thought, a commitment to listen to them as they made themselves
heard, namely, through the texts they had written. This may be difficult—
at times almost impossibly difficult—but it is the task historians set for
themselves. Indeed, against the confidence that modern mathematics with
all its harmonizing power—which is real—will explain all historical thought,
the “dogmatism” of historians like Unguru goes always with a sober and
humble acceptance that the mind of Euclid and Apollonius and Newton may
ever hold mysteries for us.
All this, I say yet again, is consistent with Bl˚asjo¨’s statement that “as his-
torians we strive to understand past mathematics in its own right, not to rein-
terpret it by modern standards” (VB, page 118). If Bl˚asjo¨ truly believed this,
he would, no doubt, be more sympathetic to the historical scholarship of Un-
guru, Stedall, and Robson—scholarship which, I might add, has incontestably
illuminated the history of Greek and medieval mathematics (Unguru), 16th
and 17th century mathematics (Stedall), and ancient Mesopotamian mathe-
matics (Robson).
But I think it is not truly history that interests Bl˚asjo¨. Towards the end
of his critique, Bl˚asjo¨ asks us to imagine “a teacher or student of calculus
[who] wishes to know more about the subject’s history” (VB, page 120), and
then asks what such a student or teacher will gain from a book like Robson
and Stedall’s Handbook. His interest, in a way, is an educational one, and
his concern is the frustration of mathematics teachers when they confront
the kind of history historians read. He thinks, therefore, there should be an
alternative history, one that mathematics teachers would find useful for their
teaching of essentially modern mathematics. It is this, I believe, he is calling
“rational history.”
The clearest description Bl˚asjo¨ gives of “rational history” is in the fifth
paragraph, which begins:
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The rational history of mathematics, then, is about understand-
ing the development of mathematical ideas: to uncover the mo-
tivating forces behind their genesis, the interplay between them,
and the ways in which they were understood and applied by the
people who explored them (VB, page 115).
This is very much along the lines of Toeplitz’s proposal for teaching calculus
“genetically” [17]:
The proposal presented here for curing all these [pedagogical]
difficulties I have gradually developed and tested from my own
lecture practice for the last nineteen years, and I hope some-
day to be able to present it in the form of a textbook; I should
like to call it the genetic method. I started from the second of
the three moments [the difficulty providing technical knowledge
without killing students’ interest in calculus] just described and
said to myself: all these subjects of infinitesimal calculus studied
today as the canonized requisites of the subject, the mean-value
theorem, Taylor series, the concept of convergence, the definite
integral, and above all the differential quotient itself, and about
which questions as to “Why is that so?” “How were these arrived
at?” are never asked—all these requisites, nevertheless, must have
been at one time objects of absorbing investigation, exciting ac-
tivity, namely, at the moment of their creation. If one were to
go back to the roots of the concepts, the dust of time and the
abrasions of long use would fall away from them, and they would
once more stand before us full of life ([17, pages 92–93], transla-
tion from [9]).
Toeplitz was, like Bl˚asjo¨ I think, seriously interested in what might help
students learn mathematics and develop a taste for it. He thought that a
historically-oriented approach, based on a view (as dubious as it is seduc-
tive) that the development of students’ understanding of mathematics runs
roughly parallel to the development of the subject itself, would address prob-
lems that were strictly pedagogical. At the same time, he was wise enough to
distinguish what he was doing in his own classes and what he was proposing
from history itself. He says he wants to prevent the misunderstanding that
he is dealing with a “historical method”:
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Not without reason, this catchphrase [i.e. “historical method”]
is unpopular; the historical brings to mind the idea, which we,
on the contrary, would particularly like to eliminate, of the old
and antiquated, the roundabout paths often followed by research,
the subjective and haphazard nature of scientific discoveries. It is
especially important to me to draw a dividing line in this direction
(page 94). The historian, including the historian of mathematics,
has the task of recording all that has been, whether good or bad.
But I want to select only the motives for those things in history
which afterwards proved successful, and I want to make use of
them directly or indirectly. Nothing could be further from me
than to lecture about the history of infinitesimal calculus: I myself
ran away from such a course when I was a student. My motive is
not history, but the genesis of problems, facts, and proofs, about
the decisive turning points within that genesis (pages 93–94).
Toeplitz was not always successful in keeping his “genetic approach” separate
from “history” (see [9]) ; however, he was well aware that a distinction had
to be made. There may be different ways of relating to the past or using
the past. These are not necessarily illegitimate. At the same time, one must
be careful not to fall into the error of deeming any reference to the past as
history. This is why Oakeshott [15, 14] whom I mentioned above, carefully
distinguished a “practical past” from a “historical past.” The history of
mathematics as history can be discussed and refined—and, as I stressed in
this response, historians including those Bl˚asjo¨ upbraids in his Critique do
just that—however, one must always remember that it is history, like it or
not.
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